DISEC
Chair: Jayati Gupta
Vice Chair: Diya Gopinath

Agenda: Preventing a Space Arms Race

The Committee

The United Nations (UN) Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was the first of the Main Committees created in the General Assembly when the charter of the United Nations was signed in 1945. Hence, this committee is often referred to as the First Committee. DISEC was formed in response to the call for an international forum to discuss issues of peace and security among countries around the world. This was deemed important after the usage of the atom bombs in World War II. According to the UN Charter, the main purpose of DISEC as a committee of the General Assembly is to establish "general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments". Membership in DISEC is extended to all 193 members of the UN, in accordance with its mission to have purposeful conversations and resolutions. The committee also works closely with the UN Disarmament Commission and Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only main committee which allows verbatim records coverage. Each member of DISEC, as with the other committees in the General Assembly, has one vote in decisions made by the committee. Most discussions in DISEC focus on making recommendations and passing resolutions for world peace and security.

Introduction

This race began when Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite by the USSR, was launched in 1957. During this time period, the Soviet Union and the USA were engaged in the Cold War, and had poured generous funding into taking the lead and conquering space. This is what eventually caused the Space Race.
A few months after the launch of Sputnik 1 came the United States of America's first attempt at a satellite launch: Vanguard TV3. This project ultimately failed which led to the creation of NASA, less commonly known as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in 1958.

Around the close of the 1960s, both superpowers were routinely releasing satellites. These satellites enabled them to do a various number of activities benefiting their military including but not limited to taking pictures of each other's military placements. Apart from this, the technology both countries were using continued advancing; they were now trying to develop anti-satellite weapons which could destroy other satellites. Moreover, different kinds of weapons including those of a nuclear nature were also being researched. These would have the capacity to cause mass death once perfected.

How the space arms race evolved

Post Cold War, the space race seems to revolve around certain main applications. At the front is the use of 'spy' or reconnaissance satellites. This began in the Cold War era but has significantly progressed. These satellites are now used for a variety of missions including, but limited to, high-resolution photography, communications eavesdropping, and covert communications. Satellites are also used by nuclear nations to alert them of missile launches, locate nuclear detonations, and detect preparations for surprise nuclear tests. This was the case in the nuclear tests in Pakistan and India in 1998 and the detection of a nuclear detonation in the Indian Ocean in 1978 that was believed to be of South African origin. Early-warning satellites were also used by the United States of America to alert Israel of Iraqi missile launches during Desert Storm.

After the Cold War ended, the space race began to slow down. The USA was the only major power left, and had a major head start on the militarisation of space. Despite this, the space arms race has not yet ended, and it has only picked up speed in recent years. It is unlikely that this conflict will end without serious intervention and, as always, the cooperation of every nation. A set of guidelines is necessary so that humankind can benefit from space exploration, rather than be destroyed by it. India, China, and Japan along with other countries have all started their own space programmes and are currently trying to create a foothold in the vast expanse of space. The EU works as a whole to challenge technology made by the US.

By 1982, the Soviet Union tried to reenter the space race. They established the USSR space forces in the same year. In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated. After the establishment of the Russian Armed Forces on 7 May 1992, the Russian Space Forces was created on 10 August of the same year. In July 1997 the Space Force was dissolved as a separate service arm and incorporated to the Strategic Rocket Forces along with the Space Missile Defense Forces, which previously were part of the Troops of Air Defense. The Russian Space forces was then again, reborn on June 1, 2001 as an independent section of the Russian military.

"The weaponization of outer space is inextricably coupled to technological advances, therefore existing PAROS agreements —such as the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement — do not address more recent concerns. Furthermore, they allow for broad interpretations and do not lay out concrete actions. Clearly, the legal framework within which the international arena operates needs to be improved. Bearing in mind the leverage that placing weapons in space would represent for a given state, the weaponization of space would create large shifts in the current balance of military power and endanger the state of current arms control agreements. In this light, the General Assembly, by discussing the

implications of 1 Space debris are remains of spacecraft or natural components that still orbiting in space or have fallen to Earth. The current technological and scientific developments, will seek to formulate a legal framework that facilitates cooperation and regulation on such matters. Moreover, in order to bring about cooperation, concrete transparency and confidence-building measures need to be put forth. Finally, the issues of safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities need to be taken into account when formulating long-term solutions to this problem."

Treaties, resolutions and conventions

Year	Event
1963	Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water
1967	Outer Space Treaty
1968	Rescue Agreement
1972	Liability Convention
1975	Registration Convention
1979	Moon Agreement
1985	Convention on The International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)
2007	A/62/114 and A/62/114/Add.1, Reports of the Secretary-General on TCBMs in outer space
2010	A/RES/65/68, Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities
2011	A/62/114 and A/62/114/Add.1, Reports of the Secretary-General on TCBMs in outer space

Problems

The greatest danger in outer space is that almost anything can be used as a weapon. It does not take more than a tiny rock or other space debris to destroy a satellite or damage a space shuttle. However, apart from this, there are many existing tensions regarding the use of arm in space.

Since the earliest communication satellite was launched, the militarization of space had begun. Today, military forces across the world rely on satellites for command and control, communication, monitoring, early warning and navigation. While these military uses might seem 'peaceful', they can be used for negative purposes also. For example, satellites can be used to direct bombing raids or even to orchestrate a 'prompt global strike', which is the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations. Apart from this, many countries feel that their privacy is highly compromised as satellites from other countries can monitor their activity, including any nuclear tests. While countries using the satellites argue that this monitoring ensures global security, others argue against the same.

The Outer Space Treaty was signed in 1967 through the United and has to date, been ratified by 105 countries. It acts as the constitution of outer space. This treaty allows only for satellites and other machinery to be put in orbit if meant for peaceful purposes. Space weaponization refers to the placement of in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity; this is banned by the treaty. Apart from this, no country is allowed to claim ownership of any celestial land. However, with modern advancements, many loopholes have emerged in this treaty. One of its major failings in the modern era is its sole focus on countries. Many private companies, such as Lunarland, have exploited this and offered to sell plots on the moon. Companies justify such activity by arguing that the treaty solely prohibits the national appropriation of celestial territory. Therefore, this technically means that a company or an individual can make claims to land in outer space since they are not countries. In order to tackle such shortfalls, some countries have matters into their own hands. For example, the United States of America passed the Space Act of 2015 which allows their citizens to engage in the exploration and exploitation of land in outer space for commercial reasons.

Since it is very hard to regulate the space-based devices put into orbit by different bodies, in terms of a 'space police', it is very easy for countries to break the treaty by putting into orbit space-based devices that constitute as weapons. For example, on March 1, 2018, Vladmir Putin spoke on a variety of provocative weapon systems under development. One of them, the RS-28 Sarmat, was depicted as placing a nuclear weapon into a presumably orbital trajectory that could strike targets by traveling the long way around the globe. While many countries, including the US condemned this act, none filed it as a violation of the Outer Space Theory. This may be in part because the Johnson Administration set the precedent that testing such a weapon system would not be a violation when it stated publicly that the Soviet Union's "Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)," based on the predecessor to the RS-28, did not violate the treaty. Before and after the treaty's signing, the administration internally debated the activities it would permit and their ability to verify compliance, ultimately concluding that the treaty was intended to prohibit a different type of weapon system.

Recent Developments

Most recently, 25 governments met up to discuss and prevent a space arms race. This resulted in an accusation made by the US on China and Russia for developing technology that is destructive, as well as various other consequences including the US building its own anti-satellite weaponry.

Important points to consider from recent data that has been analysed are:

China surpassed the United States in the total number of space launches for 2018, with 38 compared to 34, and showcased its technological advancements by landing a rover on the back side of the moon.
• China's SJ-17 satellite continued testing remote proximity operations in early 2018 around two other Chinese satellites.
• China appears to have placed truck-mounted jammers on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 2018.
• In June 2018, Symantec reported a sophisticated hacking campaign from China that targeted satellite operators, defense contractors and telecommunications companies.
• Russia conducted its seventh test of the PL-19 Nudol direct ascent anti-satellite system in December 2018 using a mobile launching system.
• A picture surfaced in September 2018 showing a Russian MIG-31 fighter jet carrying what is believed to be a mock-up of an air-launched anti-satellite missile.
• In September 2018 it was reported that Russia is developing a suspected new co-orbital anti-satellite system known as Burevestnik designed for operations in geosynchronous Earth orbit.
• France in September complained publicly about Russian remote proximity operations near a French-Italian military satellite.
• Russia has been actively using its electronic counter-space systems to jam GPS signals around Norway and Finland for multiple NATO and allied military exercises, including Trident Junction 18 and Exercise Clockwork in January 2019.

India was also established as a competitor in space technology to countries such as China.

Questions a resolution must answer

1. How can space be defined? How about space weapons?
2. Should the Outer Space Treaty be modified and if yes, in what way?
3. How viable is the implementation of a body to solely monitor and regulate the space-based devices which are put into orbit?

4. What types of weapons should be allowed in space, if any?
5. Should countries be required to transparently display their space-related activities or ventures, including weapons and satellites previously launched?

   Remember that these are only some guiding questions a resolution should answer and not a framework.

Resources

1. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space
2. https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/
3. https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gadis3310.doc.htm
4. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/focus
5. http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-a-guide-to-the-discussions-in-the-cd-en-451.pdf
6. https://indianarmy.nic.in/WriteReadData/Documents/Weaponisation.pdf
7. http://theconversation.com/the-outer-space-treaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381
8. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3454/1
9. http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-a-guide-to-the-discussions-in-the-cd-en-451.pdf
10. https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/

Example Resolution:

Resolution GA/3/1.1

General Assembly Third Committee
Sponsors: United States, Austria and Italy
Signatories: Greece, Tajikistan, Japan, Canada, Mali, the Netherlands and Gabon
Topic: "Strengthening UN coordination of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies"

The General Assembly,

Reminding all nations of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which recognizes the inherent dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all global citizens, **[use commas to separate preambulatory clauses]**

Reaffirming its Resolution 33/1996 of 25 July 1996, which encourages Governments to work with UN bodies aimed at improving the coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance,

Noting with satisfaction the past efforts of various relevant UN bodies and nongovernmental organizations,

Stressing the fact that the United Nations faces significant financial obstacles and is in need of reform, particularly in the humanitarian realm,

1. Encourages all relevant agencies of the United Nations to collaborate more closely with countries at the grassroots level to enhance the carrying out of relief efforts; **[use semicolons to separate operative clauses]**

2. Urges member states to comply with the goals of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs to streamline efforts of humanitarian aid;

3. Requests that all nations develop rapid deployment forces to better enhance the coordination of relief efforts of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies;

4. Calls for the development of a United Nations Trust Fund that encourages voluntary donations from the private transnational sector to aid in funding the implementation of rapid deployment forces;

5. Stresses the continuing need for impartial and objective information on the political, economic and social situations and events of all countries;

6. Calls upon states to respond quickly and generously to consolidated appeals for humanitarian assistance; and

7. Requests the expansion of preventive actions and assurance of post-conflict assistance through reconstruction and development. **[end resolutions with a period]**

The **pre-ambulatory clauses states** all the issues that the committee wants to resolve on this issue. It may state reasons why the committee is working on this issue and highlight previous international actions on the issue. Pre-ambulatory clauses can include:

- Past UN resolutions, treaties, or conventions related to the topic
- Past regional, non-governmental, or national efforts in resolving this topic
- References to the UN Charter or other international frameworks and laws
- Statements made by the Secretary-General or a relevant UN body or agency
- General background info formation or facts about the topic, its significance, and its impact.



Operative clauses

Operative clauses state the solutions that the sponsors of the resolution proposes to resolve the issues.

Sample Operative Phrases

Accepts
Affirms
Approves
Authorizes
Calls
Calls upon
Condemns
Confirms
Congratulates
Considers
Declares accordingly
Deplores
Designates
Draws the attention
Emphasizes
Encourages
Endorses
Expresses its appreciation
Expresses its hope
Further invites
Further proclaims
Further reminds
Further recommends
Further requests
Further resolves
Has resolved
Notes
Proclaims
Reaffirms
Recommends
Regrets
Reminds
Requests
Solemnly affirms
Strongly condemns
Supports
Takes note of
Transmits
Trusts